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In this paper, I contrast the effects of individual and spousal disability on subjective well-
being and labor supply using data on couples from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the 
years 1984 to 2006. I find that both men and women reduce their propensity to work when 
they or their partner become disabled. The effects of spousal disability are economically large. 
I find no evidence for hours and wage adjustments by spousal disability, although there are 
wage effects of individual disability. The life-satisfaction of women, but not of men, is 
reduced considerably by their partners’ disability. The effects are about 33 to 50% as large as 
those of individual disability. I also find no evidence that individuals adapt to their partners’ 
disability, although there is adaption to individual disability.  
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The interrelation between economic outcomes and individual health, e.g., individual 
disability, permanent diseases or other types of adverse health shocks, have been thoroughly 
studied in the literature (see, e.g, the review by Currie and Madrian [1999] or Fischer and 
Sousa-Poza [2009], Kidd et al. [2000], Wagstaff [2007], Zhang et al [2009] for recent work). 
Relatively unsurprisingly, the general (qualitative) consensus from that literature is the 
finding of a negative relationship between deteriorating individual health on the one side and 
wages or employment prospects on the other side.  
In contrast, in this paper I answer a related, but somewhat different question: While I 
also provide estimates for the effects of individual disability
1 as a comparison, my concern is 
how individuals react to the disability of their partner or spouse. Such a reaction is intuitively 
plausible as the respective partner may be forced to increase labor supply to offset the 
earnings loss caused by their partner’s disability or, to the contrary, may decide to stay at 
home and care for him or her. I also consider the question how a spousal disability affects 
measures of subjective well-being and to what extent people adapt to their spouse’s disability.  
The available evidence on labor supply is relatively sparse and exclusively from the 
US: Berger and Fleisher [1983] consider the labor supply responses of wives to their 
husband’s illness. Their results indicate that depending on the availability of other income 
sources, specifically social transfers, the wife either increases her labor supply as a result to an 
adverse health shock for her husband if transfer payments are not available or decreases her 
labor supply to care for her husband if other income sources are available. However, their 
results are based on data from the 1970s, in other words from a time where female labor 
market attachment was considerably lower than today. Haurin [1989], using data from the 
                                                 
1 The disability measure used in this paper is defined in accordance with German social security law, has several 
legal consequences, e.g.., when it comes to employment and is only granted after an official examination, where 
the conditions that have to fulfilled are legally fixed, See section 2 for details. NLS for 1979 to 1981, finds no significant effect on a woman’s labor supply when her 
husband’s health worsens. Siegel [2006] uses cross-sectional data from the 1992 Health and 
Retirement Survey and finds adjustments of the labor supply of women, whose directions 
depends on the specific illness the husband suffers from. Her data, however, cover only older 
individuals between 50 and 61 years of age whereas I also consider younger individuals.
2 The 
only other study to consider the effects of a wife’s worsening health on her husband’ labor 
supply is Charles [1999], who uses data from the first two waves of the Health and 
Retirement Survey, and finds evidence that men tend to reduce their labor supply in a reaction 
to their partner’s poor health, whereas women tend to increase theirs. However, similar to 
Siegel [2006], he also focuses on older individual who were between 45 and 65 years of age 
at the time of the first wave of the survey. 
In this paper, I present first evidence on labor supply reactions for a European country 
and first evidence for women of all ages’ reactions to their partner’s disability using panel 
data from the German Socio-Economics Panel for the years 1984 to 2006. My results suggest 
that employment probabilities for both men and women are reduced by between 5 and 7 
percentage points by their partner’s disability, regardless of whether household net income is 
held constant. The effects are slightly larger for women, but are also quite substantial for men. 
Conditional on being employed, I find no effect of a partner’s disability on either (actual) 
working hours or wages. 
It is also well-known that disability tends to reduce measures of subjective well-being 
(see, e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag [2002], Lucas [2007], Oswald and Powdthavee 
[2007] and Ville et al [2001] for disability and, e.g., Groot et al. [2004] and Wu [2001] for 
other permanent health shocks). As there is evidence that subjective well-being measures 
within families are correlated (see, e.g., Winkelmann [2005] and Bruhin and Winkelmann 
[2009]), a fact that can be explained by other-regarding preferences or altruism within 
                                                 
2 In addition, there is also some evidence on the effects of children’s health on a mother’s labor supply (see 
Gould [2004]).  families in the spirit of Becker’s Treatise on the Family (Becker [1991], chapter 8), one can 
also suspect that individual disability may have a detrimental effect on the well-being of the 
respective partner. I study this question using life-satisfaction regressions and find evidence 
that women, but not men, are harmed by the disability of their respective partner, regardless 
of whether income effects are controlled for. Note that this result is similar to findings by 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann [1995] on the external effects of a partner’s unemployment.  
There is also plenty of evidence that individuals tend to adapt, at least partially, to a 
variety of conditions (see, e.g. Easterlin [2001], [2003], [2005] for income, Clark and Oswald 
[1994] for long-term unemployment and Clark et al. [2008] for a variety of social or 
economic events). With respect to disability the results are somewhat inconclusive: While 
Oswald and Powdthavee [2007] find evidence that individuals adapt partially to disability, the 
evidence in Lucas [2007] suggests that there is no adaption. The results in this paper are more 
similar to Oswald and Powdthavee [2007] when it comes to individual disability (and in fact 
almost identical to their secondary results in the appendix, where they use the same dataset as 
me). However, both women and men do not seem to adapt to their partners’ disability. While 
this result is hardly surprising for men as there was no effect to begin with, it is potentially 
relevant for women. 
Econometrically, my estimates rely on the assumption that a partner’s health changes 
are exogenous with respects to an individual’s labor supply or individual well-being. This 
assumption seems relatively innocuous, in particular as previous researchers have often used 
the stronger assumption that changes in individual disability are exogenous with respect to 
that individual’s life-satisfaction (see Oswald and Powdthavee [2007] for the case of 
disability, Wu [2001] relies on a similar argument when looking at heart conditions). 
Additionally, I use fixed-effects estimators to control for unobserved heterogeneity and 
control for a fairly standard set of covariates, including work- and unemployment experience, years of schooling and socio-demographic characteristics in the wage and employment 
estimates and additionally for labor force status in the subjective well-being estimates. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and 
descriptive evidence. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy and results for the effects on 
labor supply and wages. Results from the life-satisfaction regressions are presented in section 
4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
II. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
The data come from the 1984 to 2006 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP, see Wagner, Frick, Schupp [2007] for a general overview), a representative 
longitudinal household survey of the German population provided by the DIW Berlin. Further 
information on the sampling design as well as additional information on the overall structure 
of the SOEP can be found in Haisken-DeNew and Frick [2005]. 
I use two measures of disability, both tied to the definition of a disabled person in 
German social security legislation. The first is an indicator whether an individual is 
considered to be severely disabled by German law. This is the case when the degree of 
disability, as determined by an official medical examination exceeds 50, which equals, e.g., 
the loss of a lower arm or the loss of a hand. Individuals with a degree of disability between 
30 and 50 may obtain disability status when they would otherwise be unable to find a job (see 
§2 SGB IX, book 9 of the German social security code). The second measure is the degree of 
disability which runs from 0 to 100 (in steps of 5 or 10). The conditions that have to be 
fulfilled for a certain degree are legally fixed and are laid down in the Anhaltspunkte für die 
ärztliche Gutachtertätigkeit (see, e.g., Schillings and Wendler [2006]). About 85% of all 
disabilities are caused by disease, while roughly 5% are congenital, related to accidents or to 
war wounds respectively (see Statistisches Bundesamt [2003]). Note that changes in the disability measures observed in the sample are most likely caused by disability or accidents as 
congenital disabilities are fixed at birth and those related to war wounds are almost 
exclusively the results of World War II and are consequently fixed before the observation 
period.  
I restrict the sample to individuals between 18 and 75 years and keep only those 
observations where a partner is present and has non-missing information on his or her 
disability status. I also drop observations where the variation in the partner’s disability status 
arises through individual’s changing partners as there is little reason to suspect adaption to the 
health status of a former partner or labor supply responses in reaction to the disability of a 
former partner. Note, however, that results are almost identical when keeping these 
observations, which is not surprising as there are relatively few separations following a 
disability. The latter observation is also in line with US evidence found by Charles and 
Stevens Jr. [2004]. Finally, I drop cases where the changes in disability occur before the 
observation period. These cases contribute nothing to the estimates as these exploit within-
person variation. Additionally, some analyses regarding adaption effects use the duration of 
the disability which is unknown for these cases. After dropping observations with missing 
information on any control variable, I end up with 49,078 person-year-observations from 
8,177 men and with 49,312 person-year-observations from 8,369 women. Descriptive 
statistics for both samples can be found in table 1. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.] 
Figures 1 to 3 display the distribution of subjective well-being, gross monthly labor 
income and employment by disability status. From figures 1a and 1b it is apparent that both 
men and women who are disabled or have a disabled partner are somewhat less happy than 
non-disabled individuals. From figures 2a and 2b, we see no apparent wage effects for women, 
while a greater share of disabled men and men with a disabled partner seem to be clustered in lower income groups. For employment, figures 3a and 3b show that both disabled individuals 
and individuals with a disabled partner are less likely to be in employment.  
[FIGURE 1a TO 3b ABOUT HERE.] 
 
III. DISABILITY, LABOR SUPPLY AND WAGES 
In this section, I consider the effects of own and spousal disability on the probability to 
be employed, the (actual) weekly working hours and the natural log of the monthly gross 
labor income. The usual estimating equation can be written as  
yit = αi + θt + β’Xit + τ*Dit + εit,        ( 1 )  
where  αi and θt are individual and year fixed-effects, Xit contains time-varying control 
variables, εit is a standard error term and Dit is the respective measure of individual or spousal 
disability. Depending on the model Dit contains either a dummy variable indicating (legal) 
disability status (Model I) or the degree of disability in a linear specification (Model II). In the 
case of working hours and wages, equation (1) is estimated using the standard within-
estimator, while Chamberlain’s [1980] conditional logit estimator is used in the case of 
employment probabilities. Standard errors are clustered at the person level to allow for 
arbitrary auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity within persons.  
The included control variables are a set of dummies for household composition (which 
includes information on children), nationality and marital status, years of education and the 
years of full-time work and unemployment experience respectively. Equation (1) is estimated 
in two specifications, in- and excluding net household income, to gain an impression of the 
importance of income effects. These are potentially important as the results by Berger and 
Fleisher [1984] suggest that the availability of income transfers may influence individual 
labor supply responses. Note at this point that my measure of net household income also includes transfers and other income redistributions through social security or the tax system, 
but also income from other sources, e.g., stocks.  
The central question for the causal interpretation of τ is whether individual or spousal 
disability is indeed exogenous with respect to labor supply or wages. Remember from section 
2 that changes in disability status during the observation period are the results of disease or to 
a much lesser extent accidents, while disabilities from war wounds and congenital disabilities 
are likely fixed at the beginning of the observation period. Note further that we can essentially 
rule out biological confounders that make individuals more vulnerable to disease and, e.g., 
intrinsically less likely to work as these should be captured by the fixed effects. However, 
there might be some issues with reverse causality when looking at individual disability, if, e.g., 
long working hours make individuals more likely to become disabled, for instance through 
strokes. While this possibility cannot be ruled out, it should be considerably less relevant for 
the partner’s disability, which is the main focus of this paper. The essential assumption 
needed to give τ a causal interpretation in the estimations of main interest is that changes in a 
partner’s disability status are uncorrelated with unexplained changes in individual labor 
supply which seems plausible. 
Estimation results for the parameters of interest can be found in tables 2a for men and 
in table 2b for women. The respective top panel presents the estimation results without 
holding household income fix, while the lower panel presents the results including household 
income. Estimations results including the control variables, which had the expected influence, 
are available from the author on request.  
[TABLES 2a AND 2b ABOUT HERE.] 
For both men and women, the results show a reduction in the propensity to work for 
individual and spousal disability. These effects exist regardless of whether income effects are 
controlled for. Evidence on marginal effects from simple linear probability models suggest 
that an individual disability reduces the probability to be employed by about 23% for men and by about 18 to 19% for women with slightly larger effects being found when not controlling 
for income effects. A partner’s disability in comparison reduces employment probabilities by 
5 to 5.5% for men and by 5.4 to 7% for women, which is economically large. Looking at 
incremental increases in the degree of disability shows relatively similar results: For men a 10 
point increase in individual disability reduces employment probabilities by 4%, while the 
same increase in the partner’s disability leads to a 0.8 to 1% reduction in the probability of 
employment. For women, the corresponding values are a 5% reduction in the case of an 
individual disability and a 0.8 to 1% reduction in the case of a partner’s disability. 
Looking at working hours and gross labor income reveals a relatively similar picture: 
Both working hours and wages drop after an individual disability for both men and women, 
although the effects on working hours are economically negligible, while there is no effect to 
be found for the partner’s disability. Additionally, point estimates, in particular when looking 
at wages, are essentially zero. 
To sum up: Individual disability leads to considerable negative effects on both the 
probability to be employed and on wages. The disability of a partner does not reduce working 
hours or wages, but has an economically large and statistically significant negative effect on 
the propensity to work. These effects do not differ much between men and women, which is 
different from the results found by Charles [1999]. Additionally, unlike Berger and Fleisher 
[1984] my results do not differ when household income (including transfers) is in- or 
excluded. 
IV. DISABILITY, SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING AND ADAPTION 
In a first step, I use life-satisfaction regressions of the form 
yit = αi + θt + β’Xit + τ*Dit + εit,         ( 2 )  
where αi and θt are individual and year fixed-effects, yit is the measure of subjective well-
being described below, Xit contains time-varying control variables, εit is a standard error term and Dit is again the respective measure of disability. Similar to the previous models Dit 
contains either a dummy variable indicating (legal) disability status (Model I) or the degree of 
disability in a linear specification (Model II) The included control variables are a set of 
dummies for household composition (which includes information on children), dummies for 
labor force status and nationality, years of education and work and unemployment experience. 
Apart from the dummies for labor force status these are identical to the controls used in the 
previous section. I again use two specification, in- and exluding household income, to control 
for income effects. Standard errors are again adjusted for clustering on the individual level. 
In a second step, I study adaption effects using three specifications. The first is 
identical to equation (2) using a disability dummy and adding the duration of disability in 
years. The second specification uses the degree of disability and the duration of disability in 
years. Both specification lead to the following estimation equation  
yit = αi + θt + β’Xit + τ*Dit + δ*yearsit + εit,        ( 3 )  
where τ is the incremental effect of disability and δ is the average adaption to disability over 
time. Finally, I use another specification that allows the adaption to be different for different 
levels of disability. Specifically, I use the equation  
yit = αi + θt + β’Xit + τ*Dit + δ*yearsit + λ*( Dit*yearsit) + εit,     (4) 
where Dit is the degree of disability and λ measures differences in adaption for different levels 
of severance. 
The measure of subjective well-being is the answer to the direct question “How 
satisfied are you with your life, all things considered? Please answer according to the 
following scale: 0 means completely dissatisfied, 10 means completely satisfied.” that is 
usually applied in the subjective well-being literature. I treat well-being as cardinal and apply 
the usual within-estimator. Note that Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fritjers (2004) report a relatively 
minor impact of the choice between cardinal and ordinal subjective well-being. The central identifying assumption for the effects of interest is again is that changes in a partner’s 
disability status are uncorrelated with unexplained changes in individual well-being. 
Results for the basic life-satisfaction estimates can be found in tables 3a and 3b. 
Individual disability leads to rather large losses in life-satisfaction, which was expected. 
These effects are not primarily driven by income losses as can be see from the comparison of 
the estimates in- and excluding household income. Note that the magnitude of results is 
similar to the results by Oswald and Powdthavee [2007], who considered Germany in a 
secondary analysis in their paper focused on the UK. 
[TABLES 3a AND 3b ABOUT HERE.] 
More interesting in the context of this paper are the results for the partner’s disability. 
Here, I find strong differences between men and women: While men are essentially unharmed 
by the disability of their partner, women experience a loss in subjective well-being that equals 
between 33 and 50% of the effect of individual disability. The effects are again stronger when 
income is not held fix, but remain economically large after netting out losses in household 
income. Interestingly, these results are very similar to the reactions towards a partner’s 
unemployment found by Winkelmann and Winkelmann [1995]. A potential explanation for 
these findings, apart from hypothesizing that women react more emotionally towards adverse 
strokes of fate, could be that women are more dependent on their partners than men. If, e.g., a 
woman’s social status depends to a greater degree on her partner’s social standing than it is 
the case for men, she has more to lose than income if that partner becomes disabled. While 
there is no way to test for such status effects with the available data, the fact that the results 
barely change when income is included make this explanation somewhat unlikely as income 
and social status should be correlated.  
Consider now the results for adaption effects in tables 4a and 4b. For individual 
disability the results generally show evidence in favor for adaption effects for both men and 
women, although these are not always statistically significant. Note that this finding is similar to the results by Oswald and Powdthavee [2007] for the UK. The results also show no 
evidence that the speed of adaption depends on the severity of the disability. 
[TABLES 4a AND 4b ABOUT HERE.] 
For both men and women, the results do not show evidence in favor of adaption to 
their partners’ disability. This result is not really surprising for men as there was no effect of 
their partners’ disability to begin with. The case is different for women though: Given that 
they experience economically large losses in well-being through their partners’ disability, the 
lack of adaption implies that these losses are permanent. Note that this lack of adaption is 
unusual as there is evidence that individuals adapt to marriage, widowhood, divorce, the birth 
of a child and layoffs with the usual exception being unemployment (see Clark et al. [2008]).  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I contrasted the effects of individual and spousal disability on labor 
supply, wages and subjective well-being using German panel data for 1984 to 2006. My 
results suggest that both men and women tend to adjust their labor supply on the extensive 
margin when their partner becomes disabled: Employment probabilities drop by 5 to 7 
percentage points, compared with an 18 to 23 percentage point drop caused by individual 
disability. There is no evidence on working hour adjustments, either through individual or 
spousal disability, while wages are only influenced (negatively) through individual disability. 
Results from fixed effects life-satisfaction regressions indicate that women but not men are 
harmed considerably by their partners’ disability. As expected, I find that individual disability 
tends to reduce life-satisfaction by a considerably amount, which is in line with earlier 
evidence (e.g., Oswald and Powdthavee [2007]). The results also suggest that men and 
women tend to adapt to individual disability in a similar way as found, e.g, by Oswald and 
Powdthavee [2007], but not to the disability of their partner, which makes the corresponding 
losses in well-being by women potentially permanent. All these results remain virtually unchanged when also controlling for net household income (including direct and indirect 
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 Table 1: Descriptive statistics, estimation sample 
  Men Women 
 Mean  Std.dev.  Mean  Std.dev. 
Subjective well-being (0 to 10)  6.92  1.74  6.93  1.74 
Disabled (1 = yes)  0.09  0.28  0.07  0.25 
Degree of disability (index from 0 to 100)  4.13  15.02  3.37  14.24 
Years disabled  0.41  1.61  0.31  1.44 
Partner disabled (1 = yes)  0.08  0.28  0.13  0.34 
Partner’s degree of disability (index from 0 to 100)  4.42  16.42  6.72  19.37 
Partner’s years disabled  0.38  1.53  0.62  1.93 
Age (years)  47.35  12.96  45.18  13.14 
Years of schooling  11.88  2.83  11.45  2.68 
Work experience (years)  23.69  11.98  13.23  11.45 
Unemployment experience (years)  0.68  1.63  0.77  1.72 
German nationality (1 = yes)  0.76  0.43  0.77  0.42 
Married (1 = yes)  0.90  0.31  0.90  0.30 
Real monthly net household income (€, 2000 prices)  2493.40  1518.09  2479.63  1528.21 
Real monthly gross labor income (€, 2000 prices)  2657.91  2009.85  1544.64  1175.10 
Actual weekly working hours  44.19  10.02  33.54  12.84 
Employed (1 = yes)  0.73  0.45  0.55  0.50 
Out of the labor force (1 = yes)  0.06  0.25  0.21  0.41 
Retired (1 = yes)  0.10  0.30  0.09  0.28 
Unemployed (1 = yes)  0.08  0.27  0.07  0.26 
Other labor force status (1 = yes)  0.13  0.34  0.17  0.37 
Couple without children (1 = yes)  0.36  0.48  0.37  0.48 
Couple with children younger than 16 (1 = yes)  0.33  0.47  0.32  0.47 
Couple with children older than 16 (1 = yes)  0.17  0.37  0.17  0.37 
Couple with children younger and older than 16 (1 = yes)  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.30 
Multiple generation household (1 = yes)  0.03  0.16  0.03  0.16 
Other combination (1 = yes)  0.01  0.10  0.01  0.10 
Observations (whole sample)  49,078  49,312 
Observations (wage sample)  28,973  22,697 
Observations (hours sample)  28,014  21,824 
Individuals 8,177  8,369 
 
 
 Figure 1a 
Distribution of subjective well-being measure by disability, men 
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, pooled over years 1984 to 2006  
Figure 1b 
Distribution of subjective well-being measure by disability, women 
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, pooled over years 1984 to 2006 
 Figure 2a 
Distribution of gross real monthly labor income by disability, men 
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, pooled over years 1984 to 2006  
Figure 2b 
Distribution of gross real monthly labor income by disability, women 
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, pooled over years 1984 to 2006 Figure 3a 
Employment by disability, men 
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, pooled over years 1984 to 2006  
Figure 3b 
Employment by disability, women 
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, pooled over years 1984 to 2006 Table 2.a: Impact of own and partner’s disability on employment probabilities, working hours and gross monthly labor income, male sample, only 
individuals without partner change after onset of disability 
  Employment probability  Weekly actual working hours  Ln(gross monthly real labor income) 

























Income effects not controlled for 
Disabled   -
1.7287*** 
-0.6631**     -0.7716+  0.3554      -
0.0934*** 
-0.0093    
(1  =  yes)  (0.2092)  (0.2368)     (0.4596)  (0.4611)     (0.0230)  (0.0241)    
Degree of 
disability ( 
   -
0.0371*** 
-0.0103**     -0.0145  0.0035     -
0.0017*** 
-0.0006 
index from 0 to 
100) 
   (0.0040)  (0.0039)     (0.0120)  (0.0091)     (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
N  10918  7853  10918  7853  31426 25775  31426 25775  32494  26637  32494 26637 
Income effects controlled for using ln(monthly net household income) 
Disabled   -
1.5851*** 
-0.5992*     -0.7288  0.4031      -
0.0845*** 
0.0001    
(1  =  yes)  (0.2299)  (0.2716)     (0.4580)  (0.4605)     (0.0220)  (0.0235)    
Degree of 
disability ( 
   -
0.0357*** 
-0.0096*     -0.0136  0.0044     -0.0015**  -0.0004 
index from 0 to 
100) 
   (0.0043)  (0.0048)     (0.0120)  (0.0091)     (0.0005)  (0.0004) 
N  10918  7853  10918  7853  31426 25775  31426 25775  32494  26637  32494 26637 
Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates 
control for age and age squared, education in years, lifetime full-time work and unemployment experience, German nationality, marital status, 6 household type dummies and 
year effects.. 
 Table 2.b: Impact of own and partner’s disability on working hours and gross monthly labor income, female sample 
  Employment probability  Weekly actual working hours  Ln(gross monthly real labor income) 

























Income effects not controlled for 
Disabled   -
2.1367*** 
-0.6176***     -
1.5750** 
-0.4420     -
0.0779** 
-0.0056    
(1 = yes)  (0.2425)  (0.1726)      (0.5924) (0.4836)      (0.0257) (0.0212)     
Degree of 
disability ( 
   -
0.0451*** 
-0.0106**     -0.0376*  0.0003     -
0.0018** 
0.0002 
index from 0 
to 100) 
   (0.0053)  (0.0035)      (0.0154) (0.0087)      (0.0007)  (0.0003) 
N  16558  13245  16558  13245 24699  19644 24699  19644 25633  20402 25633  20402 
Income effects controlled for using ln(monthly net household income) 
Disabled   -2.1005*** -0.4218*      -1.5577** -0.3495      -0.0756** 0.0038     
(1 = yes)  (0.2497)  (0.1762)      (0.5857) (0.4849)      (0.0254) (0.0210)     
Degree of 
disability ( 
    -0.0445***  -0.0069*     -0.0369*  0.0015     -0.0017**  0.0003 
index from 0 
to 100) 
    (0.0054)  (0.0035)     (0.0153)  (0.0087)     (0.0007)  (0.0003) 
N  16558  13245  16558  13245 24699  19644 24699  19644 25633  20402 25633  20402 
Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates 
control for age and age squared, education in years, lifetime full-time work and unemployment experience, German nationality, marital status, 6 household type dummies and 
year effects.Table 3.a: Impact of own and partner’s disability on subjective well-being, male sample, fixed 
effects regressions 
  Model I: Disability dummy  Model II: Degree of disability 
  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.. 
Income effects not controlled for 
Disabled   -0.3029***  0.0262     
(1 = yes)  (0.0612)  (0.0638)     
Degree of disability (      -0.0076***  -0.0003 
index from 0 to 100)      (0.0012)  (0.0011) 
N  49,078 49,078 49,078  49,078 
Income effects controlled for using ln(monthly net household income) 
Disabled   -0.2837***  0.0327     
(1 = yes)  (0.0616)  (0.0636)     
Degree of disability       -0.0073***  -0.0002 
(index from 0 to 100)      (0.0012)  (0.0011) 
N  49,078 49,078 49,078  49,078 
Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ 
denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates control for age and age squared, education 
in years, lifetime full-time work and unemployment experience, German nationality, marital status, 6 household 
type dummies, year effects and the following labor market states: unemployment,  out of the labor force, retires, 
other (with working being the base alternative). Full estimation results are available on request. 
  
Table 3.b: Impact of own and partner’s disability on subjective well-being, female sample, 
fixed effects regressions 
  Model I: Disability dummy  Model II: Degree of disability 
  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.. 
Income effects not controlled for 
Disabled   -0.2772***  -0.1532**     
(1 = yes)  (0.0702)  (0.0569)     
Degree of disability (      -0.0066***  -0.0033*** 
index from 0 to 100)      (0.0014)  (0.0010) 
N  49312 49312 49312  49312 
Income effects controlled for using ln(monthly net household income) 
Disabled   -0.2809***  -0.1093+     
(1 = yes)  (0.0696)  (0.0569)     
Degree of disability       -0.0066***  -0.0027** 
(index from 0 to 100)      (0.0014)  (0.0010) 
N  49312 49312 49312  49312 
Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ 
denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates control for age and age squared, education 
in years, lifetime full-time work and unemployment experience, German nationality, marital status, 6 household 
type dummies, year effects and the following labor market states: unemployment,  out of the labor force, retires, 
other (with working being the base alternative). Full estimation results are available on request. 
 Table 4.a: Adaption of happiness to own and partner’s disability status, male sample, fixed effects regressions 
  Model I: Disability dummy  Model II: Degree of disability  Model III: Degree of disability + year interaction 
  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.  Own disab.  Partner’s disab. 
Income effects not controlled for 
Disabled    -0.3508***  0.0366      
(1  =  yes)  (0.0658)  (0.0676)      
Degree of disability       -0.0086***  -0.0003  -0.0085***  0.0005 
(index from 0 to 100)      (0.0013)  (0.0011)  (0.0014)  (0.0011) 
Years disabled  0.0183  -0.0037 0.0236+  0.0002  0.0251  0.0319 
  (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0115) (0.0191) (0.0198) 
Interaction: degree and           -0.0000  -0.0006+ 
duration of disability          (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
N  49078 49078 49078 49078 49078 49078 
Income effects controlled for using ln(monthly household income) 
Disabled    -0.3384***  0.0450      
(1  =  yes)  (0.0661)  (0.0673)      
Degree of disability       -0.0084***  -0.0002  -0.0084***  0.0006 
(index from 0 to 100)      (0.0013)  (0.0011)  (0.0015)  (0.0011) 
Years disabled  0.0210+  -0.0044 0.0267* -0.0004 0.0291  0.0307 
  (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0123) (0.0115) (0.0193) (0.0199) 
Interaction: degree and           -0.0001  -0.0006+ 
duration of disability          (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
N  49078 49078 49078 49078 49078 49078 
Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates 
control for age and age squared, education in years, lifetime full-time work and unemployment experience, German nationality, marital status, 6 household type dummies, year 




 Table 4.b: Adaption of happiness to own and partner’s disability status, female sample, fixed effects regressions 
  Model I: Disability dummy  Model II: Degree of disability  Model III: Degree of disability + year interaction 
  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.  Own disab.  Partner’s disab. 
Income effects not controlled for 
Disabled    -0.3817***  -0.1104+      
(1  =  yes)  (0.0786)  (0.0602)      
Degree of disability       -0.0083***  -0.0032**  -0.0079***  -0.0031** 
(index from 0 to 100)      (0.0015)  (0.0011)  (0.0016)  (0.0011) 
Years disabled  0.0311*  -0.0119 0.0343* -0.0084 0.0483* -0.0054 
  (0.0143) (0.0109) (0.0137) (0.0109) (0.0225) (0.0173) 
Interaction: degree and           -0.0003  -0.0001 
duration of disability          (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
N  42705 42705 42705 42705 42705 42705 
Income effects controlled for using ln(monthly household income) 
Disabled    -0.3822***  -0.0680      
(1  =  yes)  (0.0781)  (0.0599)      
Degree of disability       -0.0083***  -0.0026*  -0.0080***  -0.0024* 
(index from 0 to 100)      (0.0015)  (0.0010)  (0.0016)  (0.0011) 
Years disabled  0.0309*  -0.0106 0.0338* -0.0064 0.0432+  0.0006 
  (0.0144) (0.0107) (0.0137) (0.0107) (0.0224) (0.0172) 
Interaction: degree and           -0.0002  -0.0001 
duration of disability          (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
N  42705 42705 42705 42705 42705 42705 
Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates 
control for age and age squared, education in years, lifetime full-time work and unemployment experience, German nationality, marital status, 6 household type dummies, year 
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